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On “And Vulnerable”: Catholic
Social Thought and the Social
Challenges of Cognitive Disability

I

Matthew Gaudet

N SEPTEMBER 1965, THE BISHOPS OF THE Second Vatican
Council were deep into the drafting process of Gaudium et Spes.
That document began with the now famous words: “The joys and
the hopes, the griefs and the anxieties of the men of this age,
especially those who are poor or in any way afflicted, these are the
joys and hopes, the griefs and anxieties of the followers of Christ”
(Gaudium et Spes, no. 1). That same month, Senator Robert F.
Kennedy paid a surprise visit to the Willowbrook State School, a statesupported institution for children and young adults with intellectual
and developmental disabilities (IDD) in Staten Island, NY. 1 Kennedy
was astounded and disgusted by what he saw. At the time,
Willowbrook was housing 6000 individuals in a space designed for
4000. The facilities were understaffed and in disrepair, disease was
rampant, and education was non-existent. Kennedy described the
situation as one that “borders on a snake pit…[where] the children live
in filth…[and] many of our fellow citizens are suffering tremendously
because of a lack of attention, lack of imagination, lack of adequate
manpower.” 2
I raise the chronological nearness of these two events in order to
highlight just how important the words “in any way afflicted” are to
1

It is important, at the outset, to note a distinction between the terms “impairment”
and “disability.” These terms have been used in various ways throughout the growing
field of disability studies, but, for my purposes here, I will distinguish between the
biological conditions which impair one’s cognitive abilities (i.e. cognitive
impairment) and cultural meaning and identity ascribed to those with such a condition
(i.e. intellectual and developmental disability). I address this distinction in greater
detail later in this essay.
2 “Senator Robert Kennedy Visiting Institutions in New York,” Parallels in Time: A
History of Developmental Disabilities, mn.gov/mnddc/parallels/five/5b/bobbykennedy-snakepits.html. In the video, Kennedy’s use of the term “snake pit” is likely
a reference to the 1949 movie “The Snake Pit,” a semi-autobiographical story about
one women’s experience in a mental institution. The movie’s authentic telling of
conditions in a mental institution is credited with inspiring a series of reforms in
mental institutions in the 1950s; see “The Snake Pit,” Turner Classic Movies,
www.tcm.com/this-month/article/2768380/The-Snake-Pit.html.
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the bold and beautiful claim that opens Gaudium et Spes. The suffering
experienced by the residents of Willowbrook and other ‘schools’ like
it ranks among the greatest atrocities committed in this country. While
it would be a stretch to believe that the authors of Gaudium et Spes
were thinking of Willowbrook when they claimed the griefs and
anxieties of those “in any way afflicted” as a central concern of the
Church, there should be little doubt that the suffering of those with
IDD fits well under it, both in the institution system of the midtwentieth century and at the hands of modern constructs today.
Thankfully, today, the inhuman conditions of institutions like
Willowbrook have been exposed and the institutionalization model for
persons with IDD has been largely dismantled. Moreover, with the
establishment of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1990,
protections have been set to ensure that such a situation will not be
repeated. However, neither of these advancements have fully
alleviated the particular griefs and anxieties experienced by persons
with IDD in the modern world. The ADA certainty aspired to such a
task when it set the lofty but worthwhile goals of “assur[ing] equality
of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic
self-sufficiency” for people with disabilities. 3 However, now more
than twenty-five years on, much work remains to be done. While the
challenges differ in degree, when compared to the institution era,
intentional and unintentional segregation of those with disabilities
remains a serious roadblock to “full participation” and a causal factor
in the perpetuation of stigma. In turn, social stigma and inadequate
advocacy severely limits the achievement of “equality of opportunity”
as a norm. Likewise, community-based housing and employment
programs—while well-envisioned for developing the conditions for
“independent living” and “economic self-sufficiency”—suffer from
inadequate funding, shortages of qualified care providers, and an
overall lack of political will to respond to inadequacies in the system.
In light of the ongoing social challenges or issues facing
individuals with IDD in our time, I want to highlight some
underappreciated aspects of Catholic social teaching that we would do
well to recall. The discussion proceeds in four parts. First, I identify
several key contemporary social challenges that continue to face
individuals with IDD. Second, I trace the root of those particular
challenges to the social forces of industrialization, urbanization, and
social Darwinism in the second half of the nineteenth century. Third,
on the basis of that historical framework, I argue that the contemporary
Catholic response to the various social challenges of disabled persons
has much to gain from serious consideration of Catholic social
3

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Public Law 101-336. 108th Congress, 2nd
session (July 26, 1990), www.ada.gov/pubs/adastatute08mark.htm.
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thought’s beginnings in Rerum Novarum—the Church’s response to
the suffering of the working class, as they bore the burden of the
nineteenth century social forces just mentioned. So conceived,
developments in Catholic social teaching since Rerum Novarum offer
clues as to how the tradition can be applied to the particular social
challenges facing cognitively impaired persons. Finally, I conclude
with a proposal on how this interpretation of the tradition might further
be developed and promoted.
THE CURRENT STATE OF COGNITIVE DISABILITY IN
AMERICAN SOCIETY
I focus on four overlapping social challenges or issues facing
individuals with IDD today: segregation and stigma; inadequate,
unfulfilling, and unlivable wage-earning employment opportunities;
lack of adequate housing and care; and poor education and training.
These are by no means the only issues at stake, but they are some of
the larger blocks to achieving the ADA goals of “equality of
opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic selfsufficiency.”
According to the Shriver Report, a survey conducted by the Harris
Institute in 2015, only 56% of Americans personally know someone
with a cognitive disability and a mere 13% say they have a friend with
a cognitive disability. In contrast, a whopping 42% of Americans have
had no personal contact with someone with a cognitive disability.
Similarly, while 93% of Americans believe that adults with cognitive
disabilities should be encouraged to work, and 80% said that they
would be willing to hire someone with a cognitive disability, a paltry
5% have actually worked with someone with a cognitive disability. 4
One of the primary reasons that only 5% of the national population
reports having worked with someone with a cognitive disability is that
only 6% of adults with a cognitive disability actually work in the
community. According to a survey of family members of adults with
cognitive disabilities, collected by the disability advocacy group, The
Arc, 9% of those surveyed indicate that their family member was
working in a “sheltered workshop or enclave setting” while a massive
85% of families report that their family members were unemployed.
This despite the fact that “the majority of people with [cognitive]
disabilities want to have a job in the community.” 5
Making matters worse, even among those working, nearly half
work for less than minimum wage. Subminimum wages, which can be
4

“Insight into Intellectual Disabilities in the 21st Century,” Disabled World,
www.disabled-world.com/disability/types/cognitive/21st-century.php.
5 “Still in the Shadows with Their Future Uncertain: A Report on Family and
Individual Needs for Disability Supports (FINDS).” The Arc, www.thearc.org/document.doc?id=3672.
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as low as $0.25 per hour, are legal loopholes built into the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 with the intention of encouraging the hiring of
people with disabilities. 6 Among those unemployed, or severely
underemployed, approximately 4.9 million Americans with a
cognitive disability—those with extremely low wages or unemployed,
and lacking other resources—rely on Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) for their basic survival. However, in 2014, the average annual
income of a single individual receiving SSI payments was $8,995,
23% below the federal poverty level. Twenty-one states do
supplement federal SSI payments, but these are also meager, ranging
from a high of $362 in Alaska to a low of $5 in Nebraska. Moreover,
these supplements have declined by 7% since 1998. 7
One consequence of these paltry rations is that those who do not
live with family are effectively priced out of a decent living
arrangement. The 2014 national average annual rent for a modest onebedroom unit was $9,360 or 104% of SSI income, and the national
average rent for a studio was $8088 or 90% of an average SSI
payment. 8 The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) Section 811 Supportive Housing program was established to
help solve this cost by producing affordable, accessible housing units
that are specifically designed for people with disabilities, but the
program has historically been unable to keep up with identified
demand. 9
Housing is just one of many government-funded services with
extremely long waiting lists, including personal assistance, therapy,
employment supports, and transportation. One third of those
interviewed for The Arc’s study reported that they are on a waiting list
for government-funded services of some kind. “A conservative
estimate is that there are more than 1 million people with [cognitive
disabilities] waiting for services that may never come.” 10 At the same
time, threats of a further shortage loom as nearly 900,000 individuals
currently live with a caregiver (typically a family member) who is over
6

“Still in the Shadows”; Cheryl Corley, “Subminimum Wages For The Disabled:
Godsend
Or
Exploitation?”
National
Public
Radio,
www.npr.org/
2014/04/23/305854409/subminimum-wages-for-the-disabled-godsend-orexploitation.
7 Emily Cooper et al., “Priced Out in 2014: The Housing Crisis for People with
Disabilities,” Technical Assistance Collaborative, www.tacinc.org/knowledgeresources/priced-out-findings/.
8 Cooper et al., “Priced Out in 2014.”
9 The Frank Melville Supportive Housing Investment Act of 2010 was aimed at
modernizing the Section 811 program to more efficiently meet demand as they have
not before. Significant waiting lists remain, however.
10 “Still in the Shadows.” See also “In California, Aid Withers For People With
Developmental Disabilities,” National Public Radio, www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2015/12/04/458458916/in-california-aid-withers-for-people-withdevelopmental-disabilities.
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60 years old and thus will soon not be able to continue to care for the
individual with a disability. 11
Finally, there is an argument to be made that part of the reason the
low employment rate for adults with cognitive disabilities is because
they are not receiving proper education when they are young. In The
Arc study, 52% of families reported that their family member left
school without receiving a high school diploma—a necessary
prerequisite for employment in many cases. At the same time, fewer
than one third of students with cognitive disabilities are fully
integrated into mainstream classes, while more than one third of
students are completely segregated from the mainstream students. 12
Thus, our special educational system, beneficial as it is in many cases,
is for most people the first encounter with the normativity of
segregation that remains in our society and consequently serves to
reinforce a norm of segregation throughout the lives of people with
IDD. As it is normative in schools, it should be no wonder that 42%
of American adults have had no personal contact with someone with
a cognitive disability.
THE MODERN SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF COGNITIVE DISABILITY
As with many social issues, alleviating the suffering of individuals
with IDD will require more than the establishment of rights or a mere
material response (i.e. proper funding of housing, education, and
employment programs). Addressing the challenges just laid out will
require a shift in the social understanding of disability. Thus, it is
important to recall the distinction between disability and impairment:
Disability is not a physical or mental defect but a cultural and minority
identity. To call disability an identity is to recognize that it is not a
biological or natural property but an elastic social category both
subject to social control and capable of effecting social change. 13

This distinction is important because, while cognitive impairments are
a natural part of the human experience and have been throughout
history, the social boundaries that emerge in response to those
impairments operate uniquely in each given society and are, in fact, a
product of that society and its history. Historians of disability have
frequently observed that our understanding—who is considered
disabled, how disability is defined, what cultural meanings are

11

Cooper et al., “Priced Out in 2014.”
“Still in the Shadows.”
13 Tobin Siebers, Disability Theory (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008),
4, hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015082696892.
12
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ascribed to a particular disability—is shaped largely by the social
context of and the historical moment in which disability occurs. 14
Moreover, not only are conceptions of disability historically
located, but they are in fact the product of human effort. “Social
problems like mental retardation are in fact social constructions…built
from a variety of materials: the desire to help and the need to control,
infatuation with science and technique and professional status,
responses to social change and instability.” 15 With this in mind, I argue
that our contemporary understanding of IDD has emerged in large part
from the changes in the social status of those with cognitive
impairments during the second half of the nineteenth century. 16 I
contend that three factors—in particular, urbanization, industrialization, and the rise of social Darwinism—converged to lay the
foundations of much of our contemporary understanding of IDD.

14

Katherine Castles, “‘Nice Average Americans,’” in Mental Retardation in America,
ed. Steven Noll and James W. Trent Jr., (New York: New York University Press,
2004), 352.
15 James W. Trent, Jr., Inventing the Feeble Mind: A History of Mental Retardation
in the United States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 6.
16 Space constraints limit my attempt to only a broad stroke summary in these pages.
For a more detailed examination of the social construction of cognitive disability, see
Trent, Jr., Inventing the Feeble Mind; Michael Wehmeyer, ed., The Story of
Intellectual Disability: An Evolution of Meaning, Understanding, and Public
Perception, 1st ed. (Baltimore: Brookes Publishing, 2013); David Wright, Downs:
The History of a Disability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), chap. 1; and C.
F. Goodey, A History of Intelligence and “Intellectual Disability”: The Shaping of
Psychology in Early Modern Europe, Kindle Edition (Burlington: Ashgate
Publishing, 2013). Additionally, Henri-Jacques Stiker’s A History of Disability, trans.
William Sayers (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), focuses primarily
on physical and sensory disability with occasional reference to cognitive disability but
offers an important examination of the social construction of disability, widely
construed, going back to antiquity. Similarly, Michel Foucault’s landmark text,
History of Madness, ed. Jean Khalfa (New York: Routledge, 2006), while primarily
an inquiry into mental illness and not cognitive disability, nevertheless offers
important insight into the social construction of normalcy and abnormality with regard
to human reason. See Shelley Lynn Tremain, ed., Foucault and the Government of
Disability (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010), 11: “An argument about
disability that takes Foucault’s approach would be concerned to show that there is
indeed a causal relation between impairment and disability, and it is precisely this: the
category of impairment emerged and, in many respects, persists in order to legitimize
the governmental practices that generated it in the first place.” Foucault occupies an
important enough place in the field to be noted here, but a full Foucaultian critique
leads away from the present topic. For more, therefore, Foucault’s ideas find
application to disability in two important works edited by Shelley Tremain: the
collection of essays Foucault and the Government of Disability as well as the June
2015 issue of the journal Foucault Studies offered on the 10th anniversary of the book
(Foucault Studies, no 9).
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COGNITIVE DISABILITY IN THE PRE-INDUSTRIAL WORLD
In 1835, Thomas Cameron was a young postmaster in rural North
Carolina; ten-year-old Lloyd Fuller was studying alongside his older
brothers in their middle class New England home. Thomas and Lloyd
would today be considered developmentally disabled; in the 1830s,
that difference alone did not disqualify them from work, education,
social invitations, or travel. 17

Literature and historical accounts as far back as the sixteenth
century give us images of the “village idiot” who was left to wander
about in public, but, as historian David Wright notes, there is little
historical evidence to sustain this stereotype as normative. 18 More
typically, in the centuries leading up to the industrial revolution,
individuals with cognitive impairments were integrated members of
society and, more fundamentally, their families. The centrality of the
family in this regard is evident in legal statutes going back at least to
the thirteenth century English court document Prerogativa Regis
(Kings Prerogative), which gave the King the right to seize the
property of fatui naturales (natural fools) who were deemed unable to
rule the estate themselves and place it in the care of a more capable
family member, “who would commit themselves to administering the
property (and maintaining the idiot and his family) in a responsible
manner.” 19 When the “fool” passed away, his lands and title would be
returned to his heirs. Similarly, at the other end of the economic
spectrum, under the Poor Laws established under Elizabeth I, local
parishes in England and Wales were deemed responsible for providing
relief to the impoverished in their locality, including those with
cognitive impairments. However, aid for those who could not care for
themselves fell again to kin. Even when family was not available, aid
took the form of “boarding out,” a form of early foster care (thus again
following a familial model, artificial as it was).
That this familial care norm would continue well into the
nineteenth century should not be surprising. During that time, the
family was the fundamental social and economic unit of society. On
the economic side, family farms and family businesses dominated the
economy, and in America’s pre-industrial agrarian economy there was
no lack of unskilled labor to be done. For the vast majority of society,
education was largely provided at home. As such, families made a
17 Penny Richards, “Beside Her Sat Her Idiot Child: Families and Developmental
Disability in Mid-Nineteenth-Century America,” in Mental Retardation in America:
A Historical Reader, ed. Steven Noll and James Trent (New York: New York
University Press, 2004), 65.
18 Wright, Downs, 24.
19 Wright, Downs, 21.
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place for all members of the clan, regardless of their abilities or
disabilities. Social hierarchies in all classes remained very tied to
familial lines. Hereditary rights remained a large part of the
organization of society. Even as families served as the primary social
unit, local communities also operated as an extension of the family as
evidenced by the responsibility of the local parish in the Elizabethan
Poor Laws and boarding out.
Early twentieth century sociologist Emil Durkheim identified these
traditional, familial and community based networks as constructed on
what he termed “mechanical solidarity.” 20 In mechanical solidarity,
relationships are held together by commonality. Local communities in
the pre-industrial West shared the same rituals, worshiped at the same
churches, attended the same schools, and partook of the same festivals.
They also shared the same immediate history: when a drought hit a
localized agrarian community or when a harvest was plentiful, all in
the community were affected. According to Durkheim, these shared
experiences were what held society together.
CARE FOR DISABILITY IN AN URBANIZED WORLD
The nineteenth century was a period of exponential growth,
massive change, and important tests for America. The nation
expanded its borders, its population, its economy and its power. It was
a century of turmoil and new beginnings. Near the eve of the century,
America mourned the death of its first president and by mid-century
survived its bloodiest and only civil war. And yet, over the course of
the century, technology advanced like never before:
By the end of the 1880s, workers in urban settings rode elevators up
to their offices in the amazing 10-story skyscrapers that were popping
up seemingly everywhere. Once at their desks, they turned on the
lights in their electrically lit offices, made calls on one of Bell’s
amazing telephones, and typed letters on their new Remington
typewriters. 21

The advance of technology had a tremendous effect on society at large.
New farm machinery meant that less manual labor was needed on the
farms. At the same time, the rise of technology created an insatiable
appetite for factory work. These two factors catalyzed a mass
migration from rural areas to urban cities in America.

20 Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (New York: Simon and Schuster,
2014), 57ff.
21 Phillip M. Ferguson, “The Development of Systems of Supports: Intellectual
Disabilities in Middle Modern Times (1800 CE to 1899 CE),” in The Story of
Intellectual Disability: An Evolution of Meaning, Understanding, and Public
Perception, ed. Michael Wehmeyer (Baltimore: Brookes Publishing, 2013), 81.
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The urbanization of America had a weakening effect on family
bonds. With less work needed on the farms, many young adults left
their family for work in the city. Distanced from traditional familial
structures, urbanized workers sought new social structures in their
new environment. The factory, rather than family, became the
economic hub of society, while class replaced family as the
fundamental unit of culture. Moreover, in the cities, factory work and
especially the assembly line were made efficient by a specialization of
labor.
The urban living environment encouraged specialization in other
areas as well. No longer did each family own its own cow and churn
its own butter. Rather, these former domestic tasks became centralized
and sold as commodities. These shifting conditions created a
functional difference in the forces that previously held society
together. Under mechanical solidarity, similarity drew neighbors into
community, but, in the new urbanized, centralized, and individualized
world, society was held together by an individualized need of the
other, or what Durkheim termed “organic solidarity.” When each
individual has a highly specialized task in society, both the survival of
the individual and the functioning of society as a whole rely on the
specialization of countless others. 22
Amidst these vast changes in society, it was likely inevitable that
our societal response to cognitive impairment would also change.
Although people with intellectual disability seldom drove the engines
of change, they were carried along with dramatic shifts in both
definition and response to what was perceived to be a growing
population of unproductive and dependent people, draining energy
from the marketplace and distracting families from their proper role
as sources of labor and respite for a hard-working population. 23

While individuals with cognitive impairments found a natural place in
the family and local community under the bonds of mechanical
solidarity, in the urbanized, industrialized, and individualized
economy, where an individual was measured by what they could bring
to the table, what they could offer to the collective machine, those who
were “unproductive” and “dependent” had no natural place.
WORK AND DISABILITY IN AN INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD
In the midst of the great industrialization and urbanization of the
nineteenth century, two economic downturns (1837-1843 and 18571861) prompted a need for an economic safety net in the new
urbanized landscape. As noted above, in traditional economies, entire
22
23

Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, 88ff.
Ferguson, “The Development of Systems of Supports,” 81.
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communities would bear their fates together, sharing the burdens of
economic hardships around the community. In the new industrialized
economy, social structures built around individualism meant that some
would remain afloat while others sank. For those in the latter category,
a wide array of “institutional solutions for all types of devalued, or
simply nonproductive, groups of people” arose. 24
The first of these “institutional solutions” was the explosion of
government-run almshouses in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries. 25 These almshouses were intended to serve as a temporary
respite for unemployed individuals as they got back on their feet.
While these almshouses did serve a social good, they were also viewed
with disdain—a last resort solution that marked the lowest point for a
prideful worker. During this same time, work was also becoming more
technical as the operation of machinery replaced many simple manual
tasks, while mass urbanization prompted tremendous competition
amongst workers for available jobs. Thus, even when a task was
relatively low skill, competition favored those who could do low skill
tasks faster and more efficiently. Soon a class of individuals emerged
that had a very difficult time of ever securing and holding a job in this
new economy and so remained dependent on the almshouses. In this
environment, a distinction arose between the temporary poor and those
with disabilities or mental illness. Those with disabilities had come to
be understood as the “legitimate” poor, free from public disdain: “True
or justifiable poverty entailed disability.” 26 When the economy
recovered in the 1860s, public almshouses fell out of favor, but the
view that those with disabilities should “legitimately” be supported by
the state remained, demanding a new solution for the organized care
of “idiots.”
EDUCATION AND DISABILITY IN A MODERN WORLD
It was around this same time, psychology began to emerge as a
distinct academic discipline and the specialized study of “idiocy” (as
opposed to “insanity”) grew as its own sub-discipline. In 1840, a
French doctor named Edward Séguin had begun a school in Paris
dedicated to the education of individuals with cognitive disabilities.
Public education for mainstream children was only just becoming a
public priority, so the idea of specialized education for those with
disabilities was especially novel. Seguin’s model was rooted in an
24 Phillip M. Ferguson, “The Legacy of the Almshouse,” Mental Retardation in
America: A Historical Reader, eds. Steven Noll and James Trent (New York: New
York University Press, 2004), 48.
25 Between 1824 and 1850, Massachusetts went from 83 almshouses to 204. In the
same years, New York went from 30 local almshouses in the metropolitan areas of
the state to a county almshouse system in which 56 of 60 counties had centralized
almshouses by 1857. See Ferguson, “The Legacy of the Almshouse,” 48.
26 Ferguson, “The Legacy of the Almshouse,” 51; original emphasis.
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assumption that education could only be effective if the students were
segregated from family and community. The belief was that, with the
proper education, individuals with cognitive disabilities could be
“freed from inactivity and no longer a burden to their families” and
would return to their families and communities upon completion of
the program. 27
Within a decade, schools using Seguin’s model emerged in the
United States. The Massachusetts Asylum for Idiotic and
Feebleminded Youth (est. 1847) and the New York Asylum for Idiots
(est. 1851) were two of the first. When Séguin, himself, emigrated to
America in 1850, his stature in the world medical community added
legitimacy to the cause, and, by 1870, the state school had replaced
the almshouse as a “solution” for disability in America. 28
Initially, this education movement met some successes in training
and graduating “productive idiots.” However, for every successful
case, there were other residents whose “limitations were great and
whose eventual release was doubtful.” 29 For those that did “graduate,”
expectations of a smooth transition into the community never
materialized. The turbulent economic landscape meant that many
could not find work in their home communities. With no place to go
in the community, many graduates were forced back to the asylums.
By the 1880s, the focus of the state schools began shifting from
education and graduation to care and custody.
SEGREGATION AND DISABILITY IN AN EVOLVING WORLD
In the 1860s, John Langdon Down (for whom Down syndrome is
named) was the medical superintendent at the Earlswood Asylum for
Idiots in England. Down had made a name for himself as a proponent
of separating idiot asylums from lunatic asylums. (Cognitive disability
and mental illness had previously been treated as similar conditions.)
The Earlswood Asylum was the first asylum dedicated specifically to
individuals with cognitive impairments in England.
Down was also a strong proponent of specialized education and
separate treatment for individuals with cognitive impairments. Down,
however, came up a generation after Seguin, Howe, and Wilbur and
thus was influenced to a much greater degree by Darwinism and the
biological experiments and hereditary studies of Gregor Mendel,
O.S.A. Down began to speculate whether cognitive disability
represented a regression of species to an earlier form. Drawing on
popular notions that non-Caucasian races represented less developed
species, Down claimed that each of these conditions represented a
27 Trent, Jr., Inventing the Feeble Mind, 26; Ferguson, “The Development of Systems
of Supports,” 87.
28 Trent, Jr., Inventing the Feeble Mind, 17–18.
29 Trent, Jr., Inventing the Feeble Mind, 28.
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regression to an earlier form of humanity and began to classify
different types of idiots according to the races they most resembled.
The most well-known of these was the “Mongolian idiot” (the
condition now called Down syndrome), but other classifications
included “Malay,” “Ethiopian,” “Aztec,” and “Caucasian.” 30 Down
claimed that this “great Mongolian family” represented “the reversion
of Caucasian children to an earlier ‘less developed’ race.” 31 While the
racially discriminatory undertones of this analysis cannot be ignored,
Down’s ethnic classification was never fully adopted by medical
science, and, in the 1930s, Lionel Penrose conducted blood type
studies that debunked Down’s devolutionary theory. Socially,
however, the lasting effects of Down’s work and the notion that those
with disabilities were somehow less human were immeasurable.
Down was not the only person who saw implications for disability
in Darwinism. In the 1870s, the eugenics movement emerged in
Europe and America. This movement proposed that, if Darwin’s
theory of evolution is correct, then it places upon society a moral
burden to actively advance our species in future generations. 32 The
simplest way to accomplish this was by eliminating from our
reproducing population traits that could be viewed as negative and
unproductive. 33 In the United States, this meant segregation (and later
sterilization) of those with “undesirable traits,” such as cognitive
disabilities. During this time, the view of those with disabilities as
“legitimate poor” gave way to a view of disability as a menace to
society. In 1870, the U.S. census, which had counted “idiots” as a
separate category since 1840, began placing this category in the same
column as criminals and convicts. And in 1882, Congress passed the
“Undesirables Act,” which excluded convicts, paupers, the insane, and
idiots from immigrating to the United States.34 In 1878, Josephine
Shaw Lowell opened the Custodial Asylum for Feeble Minded
30

Down noted that Mongolian idiocy was the most prevalent at Earlswood. This
observation has proven indicative of the greater population as Down syndrome
remains the most common condition of cognitive disability.
31 David Wright, “Mongols in our Midst,” in Mental Retardation in America: A
Historical Reader, ed. Steven Noll and James Trent (New York: New York University
Press, 2004), 102. Historians today are quick to note that while these classifications
seem offensive today, they were actually considered liberal in Victorian England.
While the common theory of the time was that other races represented completely
different species of lesser value, Down’s theories understood that all humans evolved
from the same species. See Wright, “Mongols in our Midst,” 103-104.
32 It should be noted that the 19th century not only marked the rise of evolutionary
theory in biology, but also utilitarian theory in philosophy. Eugenics represented the
merger of the absolutist forms of both of these theories.
33 Of course, the industrial revolution had simultaneously helped to solidify the
commonly-held view that “success” was defined in terms of productivity, and
productivity was a function of intelligence.
34 Trent, Jr., Inventing the Feeble Mind, 86.
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Women in Newark, N.Y., marking the first American institution
established specifically for the custodial care (as opposed to the
education) for individuals with IDD.
Shall the State of New York suffer a moral leprosy to spread and taint
her future generations, because she lacks the courage to set apart those
who have inherited the deadly poison and who will hand it down to
their children, even to third and fourth generations? 35

The Custodial Asylum represented a new model of care in which
segregation was permanent and the end in and of itself. In the state
schools, education was the goal, and the “boarding” nature of the
school was a means to that end. Moreover, while the original state
schools were set up close to state capitals, as custodial care became
the primary focus, institutions were designed as farm colonies in
remote rural environments. During this time, families were
discouraged from visiting individuals in the asylums and instead
encouraged to forget that the family member even existed. Finally, in
contrast to the state schools, there was little hope in the institutions
that anyone would be able to “graduate” and return to mainstream
society. Under this model, custodial care was permanent, noneducational, and as far removed from mainstream society as possible.
In summary, in the span of three generations in the second half of
the nineteenth century, the typical life of an American with a cognitive
disability went from being an integrated part of the education, work,
and social life of one’s family and local community to a menial and
segregated existence of custodial care, removed from family and
community as a menace to mainstream social life. Today, while the
most glaringly undignified aspects of this era have been dismantled,
several social constructs regarding disability remain. First and
foremost, even as society moves, in theory, toward greater integration
of those with cognitive impairments into mainstream society, the
legacy of cognitive disability understood as a menace, mystery, and
drain on society still looms large in our current context and creates a
reality in which nearly half of American adults have never had any
serious contact with an individual with a cognitive impairment. 36
Second, the shift away from a traditional family structure and toward
35

Josephine Shaw Lowell, “One Means for Preventing Pauperism,” in Proceedings
of the National Conference of Charities and Correction (1879): 189-200, as quoted in
Nicole Rafter, “The Criminalization of Mental Retardation,” in Mental Retardation
in America, ed. Steven Noll and James W. Trent Jr. (New York: New York University
Press, 2004), 239.
36 Couple this history with a nearly a century of institutionalization in which the
typical American neighborhood, school, and church did not include cognitive
disability, and a certain mystery and trepidation about how to relate to those with
cognitive impairments compounds the issue all the more.
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government provided care, education, housing, and employment for
those with disabilities remains at least partially normative today. Even
those who continue to live with their families into adulthood still often
participate in public special education and other training, draw SSI and
other government funds, and partake of other public services for those
with disabilities, making the current role of the family as much
advocacy as caregiving. Third, the post-industrial capitalist economy
that is built on organic solidarity and values individuals based on their
skill, ability, and contribution remains our standard today as it was at
the height of the industrial revolution. Such a society can only locate
individuals with cognitive disabilities at the economic bottom and
dependent on either a social safety net or the charity of others (an
economic state that is underscored by a historical legacy in which
disability was synonymous with a condition of legitimate poverty.)
CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: A RESPONSE TO
SOCIAL UPHEAVAL
It is no coincidence that modern Catholic social thought emerged
around the same time that institutionalization was becoming the new
standard of care for individuals with IDD, for when he wrote Rerum
Novarum, Pope Leo XIII was aiming to address many of the same
social forces that gave rise to such treatment of individuals with IDD.
In his opening soliloquy that set the stage for the entirety of the
tradition, Leo wrote,
The elements of the conflict now raging are unmistakable, in the vast
expansion of industrial pursuits and the marvelous discoveries of
science; in the changed relations between masters and workmen; in
the enormous fortunes of some few individuals, and the utter poverty
of the masses; the increased self-reliance and closer mutual
combination of the working classes; as also, finally, in the prevailing
moral degeneracy. The momentous gravity of the state of things now
obtaining fills every mind with painful apprehension; wise men are
discussing it; practical men are proposing schemes; popular meetings,
legislatures, and rulers of nations are all busied with it - actually there
is no question which has taken deeper hold on the public mind.
Therefore, venerable brethren, as on former occasions when it seemed
opportune to refute false teaching…, We thought it expedient now to
speak on the condition of the working classes. (Rerum Novarum, no.
1)

Leo XIII leaves no doubt that the ultimate object of his work is the
plight of working people of that age. While Leo XIII’s words are not
directly addressed to individuals with IDD, in identifying the social
shifts of the urbanized, industrialized, modern world as the cause of
the plight of the working classes, Rerum Novarum and the Catholic

46

Matthew Gaudet

social tradition it spurred offer a theologically grounded critique of
modernism that is useful for the task at hand.
LAYING THE GROUNDWORK: THE THEOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE
OF HUMAN DIGNITY
The cornerstone of Catholic social teaching is the fundamental
dignity of the human person. “God has imprinted his own image and
likeness on man (see Gen 1:26), conferring upon him an incomparable
dignity…. In effect, beyond the rights which man acquires by his own
work, there exist rights which do not correspond to any work he
performs, but which flow from his essential dignity as a person”
(Centesimus Annus, no 11). This dignity is unique to humans—as the
only part of creation made in the image of God—but universal to all
humans, regardless of age, race, gender, creed, or (dis)ability. A
simplistic application of this theme would argue that those with
disabilities are made in the image of God and thus share in the unique
dignity of humanity. Equally human, the Church and her members
have a duty to protect the dignity of those with disabilities against the
forces in this world that would seek to take that dignity away. As the
US Catholic Bishops note, human dignity defines the fundamental and
basic orientation each must take towards another: “Human
personhood must be respected with a reverence that is religious. When
we deal with each other, we should do so with the sense of awe that
arises in the presence of something holy and sacred. For that is what
human beings are: we are created in the image of God.” 37
From John Langdon Down’s devolutionary theory of disability to
capitalism’s emphasis on material production as the means of
valuation for individuals, significant forces in the modern world have
contributed to the view that individuals with disabilities are of less
value than those who are not disabled. In response, Catholic social
teaching appeals to the dignity of humanity as the theological
justification for the establishment of basic rights (Gaudium et Spes,
no. 26ff), such as those laid out in the ADA. This is all good, so far as
it goes, but, as I have noted, the establishment of rights alone is
insufficient for addressing the depth and the breadth of the social
constructions that are embedded into our very understanding of
disability. Fortunately, while Catholic social thought provides a
framework for rights, it does not end with the bare assertion of rights.

37

National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Economic Justice for All: Pastoral Letter
on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy, 10th Anniversary edition,
www.usccb.org/upload/economic_justice_for_all.pdf, no. 28.
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RELIEVING THE TENSION BETWEEN FREEDOM AND COMMUNITY
IN THE MODERN WORLD
For Catholic social teaching, human dignity, rooted in the Imago
Dei, also provides the theological grounding for both human freedom
and human community.
For Sacred Scripture teaches that man was created “to the image of
God,” is capable of knowing and loving his Creator, and was
appointed by Him as master of all earthly creatures that he might
subdue them and use them to God’s glory. “What is man that you
should care for him? You have made him little less than the angels,
and crowned him with glory and honor. You have given him rule over
the works of your hands, putting all things under his feet” (Ps. 8:5-7).
But God did not create man as a solitary, for from the beginning “male
and female he created them” (Gen. 1:27). Their companionship
produces the primary form of interpersonal communion. For by his
innermost nature man is a social being, and unless he relates himself
to others he can neither live nor develop his potential. (Gaudium et
Spes, no. 12)

Human freedom, present in each individual from the moment of
creation, is our freedom to make choices and act independently from
the Divine will of God. However, even as humans are free to abuse
this freedom, we are called to perfect our freedom by directing our
choices toward God (Catechism, no. 1731). Community emerges from
freedom as one of the primary commands of the Divine will:
God, Who has fatherly concern for everyone, has willed that all men
should constitute one family and treat one another in a spirit of
brotherhood. For having been created in the image of God, Who “from
one man has created the whole human race and made them live all
over the face of the earth” (Acts 17:26), all men are called to one and
the same goal, namely God Himself.
For this reason, love for God and neighbor is the first and greatest
commandment. Sacred Scripture, however, teaches us that the love of
God cannot be separated from love of neighbor: “If there is any other
commandment, it is summed up in this saying: Thou shalt love thy
neighbor as thyself …. Love therefore is the fulfillment of the Law”
(Rom. 13:9-10; see 1 John 4:20). To men growing daily more
dependent on one another, and to a world becoming more unified
every day, this truth proves to be of paramount importance. (Gaudium
et Spes, no. 24)

Thus, while freedom is fundamental to our humanity, the proper use
of that freedom is to serve God and serve each other.
The concepts of freedom and community are important as the
devastating forces that emerged in the wake of the industrial
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revolution were, in many ways, a perversion and overindulgence of
human freedom and the undermining of human community. The status
quo in 1891 was a condition in which freedom went unchecked by
Church, state, or other communal organization:
[S]ome opportune remedy must be found quickly for the misery and
wretchedness pressing so unjustly on the majority of the working
class: for the ancient workingmen’s guilds were abolished in the last
century, and no other protective organization took their place. Public
institutions and the laws set aside the ancient religion. Hence, by
degrees it has come to pass that working men have been surrendered,
isolated and helpless, to the hardheartedness of employers and the
greed of unchecked competition. (Rerum Novarum, no. 9)

Leo’s solution was to recognize the moral burden borne by the owner
to each worker in accordance with natural law and the dignity of each
human person: “The following duties bind the wealthy owner and the
employer: not to look upon their work people as their bondsmen, but
to respect in every man his dignity as a person ennobled by Christian
character” (Rerum Novarum, no 20). That is, the owner ought to use
his freedom in the service of God and community.
At the same time, Leo cautioned about inverting the paradigm, and
placing the community as the sole value to the exclusion of the
exercise of individual human freedom, as the communists proposed.
Leo defended private property and sought limits on the power of the
communal government:
The contention, then, that the civil government should at its option
intrude into and exercise intimate control over the family and the
household is a great and pernicious error. True, if a family finds itself
in exceeding distress, utterly deprived of the counsel of friends, and
without any prospect of extricating itself, it is right that extreme
necessity be met by public aid, since each family is a part of the
commonwealth. In like manner, if within the precincts of the
household there occur grave disturbance of mutual rights, public
authority should intervene to force each party to yield to the other its
proper due; for this is not to deprive citizens of their rights, but justly
and properly to safeguard and strengthen them. (Rerum Novarum, no.
16)

Here again, however, he does not reject the notion of communal
authority and the need for public aid on the part of the commonwealth.
Rather, he takes what modern society has placed at odds—individual
freedom and the common good—and instead draws them together in
service of the same ends: service of God and neighbor.
There is a lesson in this for cognitive disability. Of the various
social structures put in place to respond to cognitive disability, those
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systems that allow too much individual freedom and favor the
capitalist market will inevitably leave individuals with IDD in a
position of scarcity and suffering. We saw this in the early industrial
age, prior to the state schools. On the other hand, efforts to restrict
freedom and create tightly controlled environments, such as in the
institutional era, find philosophical parallels in the centralizing
functions of communism. History has shown that overreaching by
central authorities in the name of the common good leads to poor
results for those with disabilities.
It is in this impasse that society finds itself today. In recent decades,
American society has stepped away from the atrocity of the institution
system with the creation of successful community-based programs
that seek explicitly to allow the greatest degree of freedom possible.
At the same time, certain legacy factors keep society from being able
to achieve such a state. On the one hand, society is still built on
individualism and organic solidarity, so if the system allows too much
individualized freedom—as is the case, for example, with
employment today—then individuals with IDD will inevitably be left
out. On the other hand, the legacy of centralized control means that
funding and authority for any of these programs still runs through the
centralized state, and, since individuals with IDD rank fairly low when
it comes to governmental priorities, funding shortages and waitlists
are common.
In Rerum Novarum, Leo argued that “no practical solution for this
[impoverishment] will ever be found apart from the intervention of
religion and the Church” (no. 16). This is as true for disability as it
was (and is) for poverty, for solving either of these issues requires a
teleological anthropology that orients our freedom toward the love of
God and neighbor. Secular documents of rights, while necessary to
avoid a regression into atrocity, merely set a floor for societal
treatment of those with disabilities. The recognition of the Imago Dei
serves as a reminder that, by the grace of God, all are free and equal
in dignity. Recognition of the Imago Dei in others, reminds us that in
that freedom and in dignity, God calls us to community.
A ‘THIRD WAY’ OF SOLIDARITY
Being called to community requires the Church, both the institution
and its membership, to be intentional about the basis of communal life.
Earlier in this essay, I noted that, in his examination of the shift from
traditional to modern economies, sociologist Emil Durkheim
identified two types of solidarity. Durkheim’s “organic” solidarity was
rooted in interdependence. I interact with you because I need
something from you. This is the way of the modern world, built on a
robust individualism, market capitalism, the division of labor, and
exchange of goods. It is also one of the most fundamental stumbling
blocks to the advancement of people or individuals or persons with
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disabilities, since they often have less (materially) to offer than the
nondisabled in the exchange and, consequently, are often excluded
from active participation in society.
Durkheim’s “mechanical” solidarity, on the other hand, arose not
out of need for what the other can offer but out of commonality with
the other. I interact with you because I share something in common
with you. For Durkheim, mechanical solidarity typified the traditional
way of life in small towns, where experiences, good and bad, were
shared by all. Today, society cannot return to its pre-industrial norms,
nor should it. The local bonds of mechanical solidarity, while perhaps
a better state of affairs for people with disabilities, also gave rise to
tremendous violence. Such bonds, rooted in cultural and material
similarity, are at the very root of war, slavery, ethnic cleansing, racism,
and genocide.
Catholic social teaching calls individuals to solidarity but not in
either of the senses that Durkheim uses the term. Catholic solidarity,
by contrast, is a prescriptive command derived from our shared
creation and existence.
Interdependence must be transformed into solidarity, based upon the
principle that the goods of creation are meant for all. That which
human industry produces through the processing of raw materials,
with the contribution of work, must serve equally for the good of all.
(Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, no. 39)

Or, as interpreted by the US Bishops:
We have to move from our devotion to independence, through an
understanding of interdependence, to a commitment to human solidarity. That challenge must find its realization in the kind of
community we build among us. Love implies concern for all especially the poor - and a continued search for those social and
economic structures that permit everyone to share in a community that
is a part of a redeemed creation. (Economic Justice for All, no. 365)

By calling individuals each to embrace a solidarity that is rooted in a
shared humanity rather than material interdependence (organic
solidarity), Catholic social teaching includes people with disabilities
as a fundamental part of society, rather than a dependent burden on
society.
SUBSIDIARITY, THE PRIMACY OF THE FAMILY, AND
LOCAL ASSOCIATIONS
For the Church, the primary model of solidarity is the nuclear
family. The family is “the most intimate sphere in which people
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cooperate…, [It is] the ‘first cell of society.’” 38 As such, it is notable
that families do not operate out of any type of functional
interdependence. At birth, a child is fully dependent on her or his
parents, and, the power of a smile or a giggle aside, an infant offers
nothing of material value in exchange for his or her care. Rather,
families are the most intimate and fundamental example of the bonds
inherent in our nature as social beings.
I have already noted the important advocacy role that family
members play on behalf of individuals with disabilities today. Despite
the efforts of the Church, the industrialized world continues to reward
individuals on the basis of material merit and, thus, reject those who
seem to have little of material value to offer. By exalting the bonds of
family, however, Catholic social teaching acknowledges the family as
the fundamental social unit to which individuals belong regardless of
material merits. As such, it also gives warrant to the family’s role as
advocate for individuals with IDD.
The Church does not expect families to carry the load themselves,
however. The bonds of the family, strong as they are, also offer the
model of solidarity for the rest of the world to emulate.
The roots of the contradiction between the solemn affirmation of
human rights and their tragic denial in practice lies in a notion of
freedom which exalts the isolated individual in an absolute way, and
gives no place to solidarity, to openness to others and service of them
… [E]very [person] is his “brother's keeper,” because God entrusts us
to one another. (Evangelium Vitae, no. 19)

While the call to solidarity is universal, the Church also recognizes the
importance of it being fulfilled locally.
Government should not replace or destroy smaller communities and
individual initiative. Rather it should help them contribute more
effectively to social well-being and supplement their activity when the
demands of justice exceed their capacities. This does not mean,
however, that the government that governs least, governs best. Rather
it defines good government intervention as that which truly “helps”
other social groups contribute to the common good by directing,
urging, restraining, and regulating economic activity as “the occasion
requires and necessity demands.” (Economic Justice for All, no. 124)

This principle of “subsidiarity” offers valuable caution against the
centralized and institutionalized responses to social problems that
have, time and time again, failed to adequately respect the human
dignity of individuals with disabilities.
38
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IN DEFENSE OF “AND VULNERABLE”
If the principle of human dignity provides the cornerstone of
Catholic social thought, then the principle of a Preferential Option for
the Poor and Vulnerable is its capstone, that which completes the arch
and holds it all together. For the past few decades the Preferential
Option for the Poor has served as a summative claim, bringing
together the whole of Catholic social thought into the singular idea.
This principle places special burdens on those who are blessed with
great fortune—be it material riches or physical or cognitive abilities—
and special rights on those who do not.
Whoever has received from the divine bounty a large share of
temporal blessings, whether they be external and material, or gifts of
the mind, has received them for the purpose of using them for the
perfecting of his own nature, and, at the same time, that he may
employ them, as the steward of God's providence, for the benefit of
others. “He that hath a talent,” said St. Gregory the Great, “let him see
that he hide it not; he that hath abundance, let him quicken himself to
mercy and generosity; he that hath art and skill, let him do his best to
share the use and the utility hereof with his neighbor.” (Rerum
Novarum, no. 23) 39

In this way, the preferential option inverts the typical paradigm in
which those with fortune and power may wield those resources to gain
more fortune and power, while those who lack these riches remain
powerless and often, thereby, victimized. Without the principle of the
preferential option, a follower of Catholic social thought might well
be satisfied with equal treatment of the powerful and the powerless. A
preferential option for the poor and vulnerable calls those who possess
power and privilege to aim beyond equal treatment and, instead, seek
a special place for those who are poor, lowly, and vulnerable.
Often, however, the “and vulnerable” clause of the principle is
omitted, thus reducing Catholic social concerns only to the materially
poor. This is a mistake. A preferential option for those with disabilities
suggests that it is not enough to simply tear down the institutions and
asylums and return individuals with disabilities to mainstream society.
Rather, the Church must give special attention to the needs of people
with disabilities in a modern world that otherwise leaves no place for
them. Special education, specialized group homes, and dedicated work
programs that help to promote the livelihood of those with disabilities
are necessary, but, as a society, we must also be mindful that an
overemphasis on “special” programs encourages segregation rather
that integration.
39 Leo XIII cites Gregory the Great, Hom. in Evang., 9, n. 7 (PL 76, 1109B). Emphasis
added.
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As a capstone, the Preferential Option for the Poor and Vulnerable
not only stands on its own, but it also draws our attention to all of the
other principles of Catholic social thought. As such, while the
promotion of the dignity and freedom of the human person are
noteworthy goals, a preferential option for people with disabilities,
ensures that efforts are aimed at the promotion of human dignity and
the protection of the freedom of individuals with disabilities
specifically. Similarly, while the advancement of community is vital
for sustaining human life, consideration to the principles of
subsidiarity and solidarity and special attention to the role of the
family will ensure that we are doing our best to serve the vulnerable
in community first. It is only when all of these points are taken in sum
that we can truly be making a preferential option for people with
disabilities.

